BECK index

SOCRATES
Inspiration

by Sanderson Beck
(based on Plato's Ion and Meno)

SOCRATES: A Series of Philosophical Plays is now published as a book. For ordering information, please click here.

Characters:

Socrates
Ion
Meno
Boy
Anytus

Scene: A street in Athens. SOCRATES is sitting on a bench and greets ION who is walking toward him.

SOCRATES
Welcome, Ion.
Where are you coming from now?
From your home in Ephesus?

Ion sits down next to Socrates.

ION
No, Socrates,
from the Asclepius festival at Epidaurus.

SOCRATES
Do the Epidaurians offer the god recitation contests?

ION
Certainly, and those of the other Muses as well.

SOCRATES
Did you compete? and how did you do?

ION
We took the first prize, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Well done; let's win the Panathenaea too.

ION
We shall, if God is willing.

SOCRATES
I've often envied you reciters, Ion, your art;
for the art requires you to adorn your body
and to appear as beautiful as you can,
and you must also spend time with many good poets,
especially Homer, the best and most divine poet,
and not only learn the epics but understand them.
For one couldn't be a good reciter
unless one understood what was meant by the poet.
Surely the reciter should interpret
the meaning of the poet for the listeners,
and one couldn't do this well
without knowing what the poet means.
So all this is worthy of envy.

ION
You tell the truth, Socrates;
this is the hardest work in my art,
and I think I speak better about Homer than anyone.

SOCRATES
Right, Ion;
then clearly you won't refuse to show me.

ION
It's worth hearing, Socrates,
how well I adorn Homer;
I think I deserve to be
crowned by the Homer Society.

SOCRATES
And I'll find the leisure to hear you,
but now answer this much for me:
whether you're smart only about Homer
or also about Hesiod and Archilochus?

ION
No, only about Homer;
that seems enough for me.

SOCRATES
Is there anything about which
both Homer and Hesiod say the same?

ION
I think there are many things.

SOCRATES
So on these do you interpret what Homer means
better than you do Hesiod?

ION
Similarly, Socrates, when they say the same thing.

SOCRATES
What about when they don't say the same?
For example, both Homer
and Hesiod mention divination.

ION
Certainly.

SOCRATES
What then?
Whether similar or different
would you or a diviner interpret better
when the poets talk about divination?

ION
One of the diviners.

SOCRATES
If you were a diviner,
couldn't you interpret the different meanings
as well as the similar ones?

ION
Clearly.

SOCRATES
Then why are you smart about Homer
but not about Hesiod and the other poets?
Does Homer talk about
different things than the others?
Doesn't he describe war and human interaction,
good and bad, of the unskilled and professionals,
interactions between gods and humans,
experiences in heaven and in Hades,
and the origins of the gods and heroes?
Didn't Homer compose poems about these things?

ION
That's true, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Aren't the others' poems about these things too?

ION
Yes, Socrates, but not in the same way as Homer.

SOCRATES
What, in a worse way?

ION
Much worse.

SOCRATES
But Homer is better?

ION
Rather better, by God.

SOCRATES
Then, dear Ion,
when people talk about numbers,
and one speaks better,
will anyone know who is right?

ION
I'd say so.

SOCRATES
So is it the same as the one
who knows the others who are wrong?

ION
The same, of course.

SOCRATES
Then is this the one who has numerical skill?

ION
Yes.

SOCRATES
And when several discuss the health of foods,
will it be different people or the same one
who knows which speaks best or worst?

ION
Obviously the same, of course.

SOCRATES
Who is this?
What is the name?

ION
A physician.

SOCRATES
So in general it's the same one
who knows about the same things,
whether people are speaking rightly or wrongly.

ION
Yes.

SOCRATES
And do you say Homer and the other poets
talk about the same things,
but not in the same way,
since one does so well,
but the others worse?

ION
And I tell the truth.

SOCRATES
Since you know the one speaking well,
you would also know those speaking worse.

ION
So it seems.

SOCRATES
Then, excellent one, we shall not be mistaken
that Ion is similarly smart
concerning the meaning
of Homer and the other poets,
since you yourself admit the same one
will be a competent judge of all
who talk about the same things,
and almost all poets
do compose about the same things.

ION
Then what is the reason, Socrates,
when someone discusses any other poet,
that I can't pay attention
and have nothing worth saying,
but simply fall asleep;
yet when someone recalls anything about Homer,
I wake up and pay attention
and have plenty to say?

SOCRATES
It's not hard to guess, my friend,
but it's clear to all that you are unable
to talk about Homer from skill and knowledge;
for if you could do it from skill,
you could also talk about all the other poets;
for there is an art of poetry as a whole,
isn't there?

ION
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then when someone acquires
any other art as a whole,
isn't the method of inquiry
the same for all the arts?
Would you like to hear
what I mean by this, Ion?

ION
Yes, by God, Socrates;
for I enjoy listening to you who are wise.

SOCRATES
I wish you told the truth on that, Ion;
but surely you reciters and actors
and those whose poems you chant are wise,
but I do nothing but tell the truth,
as an unskilled person might.
Now concerning what I just asked you,
see how poor and unskilled it is which I said
and every man may know,
that the inquiry is the same,
when one takes the whole art.
Let's take it logically:
is there an art of painting as a whole?

ION
Yes.

SOCRATES
And are there and have there been many painters,
both bad and good?

ION
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So have you ever found anyone who is smart
in discussing the successes and failures
in the works of Polygnotus,
but can't do so with the works of other painters?
who when the paintings of others are shown,
dozes off and has nothing to say,
but when the paintings of Polygnotus are mentioned,
wakes up, pays attention and has plenty to say?

ION
No, by God, of course not.

SOCRATES
But what about with sculpture?

ION
No, I haven't found that.

SOCRATES
I imagine you also failed to find that
with any other of the Muses,
whether flute or harp or reciting or whatever.

ION
I can't contradict you, Socrates;
but I am aware that concerning Homer
I speak most beautifully and have plenty to say,
and everyone else says that I speak well,
but not about the others.
So let's see why that is.

SOCRATES
I do see why, Ion,
and I'm going to explain it to you.
For not by skill do you speak well of Homer,
as I just said, but a divine power moves you,
like the stone which Euripides named the magnet.
This stone not only attracts iron rings,
but it also imparts to them a power by which
they do the same as the stone
and attract other rings,
so that sometimes
a chain of iron pieces may be formed,
suspended from each other,
and all depend on the power from that stone.
So too the Muse inspires people,
and through these inspired people
the inspiration connects others in a chain.
For all the good poets compose beautiful poems
not from skill but because they are inspired;
just as the mystics don't dance in their right minds,
so neither are the poets when they make fine songs,
but when they get into the melody and rhythm
they become frantic,
like revelers who are possessed,
and the soul of the composers works the same way,
as they say themselves.
For the poets tell us that they bring us sweets
from the fountains of the Muses,
just as the bees who fly do;
and they tell the truth.
For a poet is light and winged and sacred,
and does not compose until becoming inspired,
ecstatic, and no longer in one's own mind.
Every person who stays self-possessed
is unable to compose or prophesy.
So, like you with Homer,
since they don't compose
or speak well by skill but by divine providence,
each can only compose well what the Muse inspires:
lyrics, odes, dancing songs, epics or iambic verse;
but each is poor at anything else.
For they don't speak by skill,
but by divine power,
since, if they knew how
to speak well on one thing,
they could do so on all the rest;
because of this God takes away their mind
and uses them as ministers,
prophets and divine seers,
so that we who hear them may know that
these are not the ones saying these valuable things,
when they are not in their minds,
but God itself talking through these is speaking to us.
You know that there are some poets
who never produce anything worthwhile
until they're inspired by the Muses,
and then they produce the finest song.
For God, I think, is showing us that
we should not doubt that
these beautiful poems are not human but divine,
and the poets are merely interpreters of the gods,
according to how each is possessed by them.
To demonstrate this God purposely may send
the most beautiful song through the poorest poet;
or don't you think what I say is true, Ion?

ION
Yes, I do, by God;
for your words touch my soul,
and it seems to me it is by divine providence
that the poets interpret the gods for us.

SOCRATES
Then don't you reciters interpret the poets?

ION
That's true.

SOCRATES
Then aren't you interpreters of the interpreters?

ION
Precisely.

SOCRATES
Now tell me, Ion, and answer what I ask you:
when you're telling the epic well
and especially thrilling the audience,
either when Odysseus leaps forth on the floor,
revealing himself to the suitors with his arrows,
or when Achilles rushes at Hector,
or in any of the sad stories
of Andromache or Hecuba,
are you then in your right mind,
or have you gone out of yourself
and is your soul inspired
thinking it's in the scenes you describe,
either in Ithaca or Troy
or wherever the epic has them?

ION
How vivid is this proof you give, Socrates;
for I'll tell you without hiding anything:
when I tell anything pitiful,
my eyes are filled with tears;
and when it is of fear and awe,
my hair stands on end from fear,
and my heart leaps.

SOCRATES
What then, Ion?
Should we say that
such a person is then in one's right mind,
who at sacrifices and festivals
adorned in elegant clothing and golden crowns
weeps without having lost any of these,
or who is excessively afraid
standing before twenty thousand friendly people,
none of whom are robbing or wronging him?

ION
By God, certainly not, Socrates, to be truthful.

SOCRATES
So are you aware that you reciters
produce the same effects
on most of the spectators?

ION
I know it very well;
for at such times
I look down on them from the stage above
seeing them crying and amazed by the words.
For I have to pay close attention to them;
since if I make them cry,
I laugh at the money I make;
and if they laugh,
I cry at the money I lose.
SOCRATES
So are you aware that this spectator
is the last of the rings,
which I said receives power
from each other by the magnetic stone?
The middle one is you the reciter and the actor,
but first is the poet;
but it's God who through all these
pulls the soul of humans wherever it wishes,
making the power dependent on each other.
And just like from that stone a great chain
of chorus masters and performers are suspended,
connected like the rings
hanging down from the Muse.
One poet is suspended from one Muse,
and another poet from another Muse;
we call it possessed,
but it's almost the same, for it holds;
and from these first rings, the poets,
others are suspended who are inspired,
some by Orpheus, others by Musaeus;
but most are possessed and held by Homer.
You, Ion, are one who is possessed by Homer,
and when someone recites any other poet,
you go to sleep and don't know what to say,
but when someone speaks the verse of this poet,
at once you wake up;
your soul dances, and you know what to say;
for it's not by skill nor by knowledge
that you say what you say about Homer,
but by divine providence and by possession;
just like mystics perceive that melody alone
which belongs to the god who possesses them,
and for that tune they know the patterns and phrases,
but they're not concerned with any of the others.
So you too, Ion, when someone mentions Homer,
are ready, but not when anyone else is mentioned.
This is the reason, which you asked me,
why you're ready to speak on Homer,
but not on others,
because you're smart in praising Homer
not by skill but by divine providence.

ION
You're right, Socrates;
but I'd be surprised if you're right that
when I praise Homer I'm possessed and mad.
And I believe you wouldn't think so either,
if you would listen to me talking about Homer.

SOCRATES
And I am willing to listen,
but not until you answer me this:
about what in Homer do you speak well?
For surely it's not about everything.

ION
Be assured, Socrates, on anything.

SOCRATES
Of course not on those things
which you don't happen to know about,
which Homer relates.

ION
What kind are those,
which Homer relates,
and I don't know?

SOCRATES
Doesn't Homer often talk about skills?
For example, about chariot driving,
when Nestor advises his son about turning the post
in the horse-race honoring Patroclus.

ION
I'll recite it:
"Lean yourself in the polished car to the left,
then goad the horse on the right and loosen the reins.
At the post let the horse on the left swerve close,
so that the hub of the wheel almost scrapes the edge;
but avoid grazing the stone."

SOCRATES
Enough.
On this, Ion, would a physician or a charioteer
know better whether Homer spoke correctly or not?

ION
A charioteer, of course.

SOCRATES
Is it because he has the skill or something else?

ION
No, it's because of the skill.

SOCRATES
Then for each art
is the work's skill assigned by God?
For we know by piloting
what we don't know by medicine.

ION
Of course.

SOCRATES
Is a physician's skill the same as a carpenter's?

ION
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Then is this so of all the arts?

ION
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then will you or a charioteer know better
about what you just recited from Homer?

ION
A charioteer.

SOCRATES
For you are a reciter and not a charioteer.

ION
Yes.

SOCRATES
What about a passage telling about a remedy?
Will a reciter or a physician better discern
whether Homer is speaking correctly or not?

ION
A physician.

SOCRATES
And when Homer says:
"She plunged to the bottom like a sinker,
set in the horn-tip from a field ox,
and speeds along to catch the hungry fish,"
shall we say the fisher's skill or the reciter's
will best judge whether this is right or not?

ION
Clearly, Socrates, the fisher's.

SOCRATES
Now you tell me, Ion,
in the Iliad and the Odyssey,
which parts talk about the art of the reciter.

ION
I say all of them, Socrates.

SOCRATES
You don't say all, Ion;
are you so forgetful?
Surely forgetfulness is not proper for a reciter.

ION
What have I forgot?

SOCRATES
Don't you remember that you said
the reciter's art is different than the charioteer's?

ION
I remember.

SOCRATES
Then according to your own argument
the reciter can't know everything.

ION
Except perhaps some things, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Except which things?
what kind does the reciter know?

ION
What is proper, I think,
for a man or woman to say,
and for the slave and free person,
and for those governing and those governed.

SOCRATES
Will a reciter know sailing better than a pilot?

ION
No, the pilot.

SOCRATES
But do you mean what is proper for a slave?

ION
Yes.

SOCRATES
If the slave is a cowherd,
do you mean that
the reciter will know better
how to pacify the cows?

ION
Of course not.

SOCRATES
What about a spinning woman talking about wool?

ION
No.

SOCRATES
Do you mean how a general
should encourage the men?

ION
Yes, the reciter will know that kind of thing.

SOCRATES
But is the skill of the reciter that of the general?

ION
I would know what is proper for a general to say.

SOCRATES
When you know military strategy,
is it because you know strategy
or are a good reciter?

ION
It seems to me there's no difference.

SOCRATES
What?
Do you mean the skill of the general
and that of the reciter
are not two different things?

ION
It seems one to me.

SOCRATES
So is whoever is a good reciter a good general too?

ION
Definitely, Socrates.

SOCRATES
And whoever is a good general
is also a good reciter.

ION
I don't think so.

SOCRATES
But you do think a good reciter is a good general?

ION
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then aren't you the best reciter in Greece?

ION
By far, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Are you also the best general in Greece, Ion?

ION
For sure, Socrates, and I learned it from Homer.

SOCRATES
Then how come
you haven't been appointed a general?

ION
Because my city is ruled by Athens
and doesn't need a general,
while you and Sparta choose your own people.

SOCRATES
But Athens has chosen several foreign generals,
because they've demonstrated their competence.
Surely they would select Ion if he were worthy.
But I think you're deceiving me
when you say you know everything in Homer,
and you refuse to tell me which subjects they are
after all my efforts in trying to find out.
You're like Proteus in changing your shape,
twisting this way and that
until you escape my grasp
in the disguise of a general.
If you are a skilled artist,
you would demonstrate the knowledge
you promised me,
or else you must be lying and deceiving me.
But if you're not skilled
and speak well about Homer,
as I said,
not from knowledge but from divine help
by which you're inspired by the poet,
you're right.
So choose whether you wish to be called by us
a dishonest man or divinely inspired.

ION
That's quite a difference, Socrates,
for it's far better to be called divine.

SOCRATES
Then you're to be the better for us, Ion, divine,
and not from skill do you praise Homer.

ION
I accept that, Socrates, and now I must go.

Ion stands up and quickly walks away. Socrates sits contemplating for a moment and then walks off as the scene dissolves.

In the new scene Socrates is sitting and talking with MENO who has a servant BOY waiting nearby.

MENO
Can you tell me, Socrates,
if virtue is taught?
Or if not taught, is it gained by practice?
Or if not by practice or by teaching,
if it comes to humans by nature
or some other way?

SOCRATES
Meno, Thessaly used to be
famous for riding and wealth,
but now it seems to me they're known for wisdom,
ever since Gorgias taught your lover Aristippus.
Now you're accustomed to answering any question
fearlessly in a great way like those who know.
But here in Athens, dear Meno,
it's just the opposite,
as a drought of wisdom has occurred,
and the danger is wisdom
has left our home for yours.
If you ask anyone here a question,
they're likely to laugh and say,
"Stranger, I'm afraid you must think I'm blessed,
to know if virtue is taught or in what way it comes;
I not only don't know if virtue is taught or not,
I don't even happen to know what virtue itself is.
So, Meno, I am in the same situation;
I share the poverty of my city in this matter,
and I blame myself
that I don't know about virtue;
and if I don't know what it is,
how can I know what it's like?
Or do you think it's possible,
that one who doesn't know Meno,
could know if he is handsome or rich or noble,
or the opposite of these?
Do you think it's possible?

MENO
Not I.
But is it true that you, Socrates,
don't even know what virtue is,
and am I to take home this report about you?

SOCRATES
Not only that, my friend, but in my opinion,
I've never met anyone who does know.

MENO
What?
Didn't you meet Gorgias when he was here?

SOCRATES
I did.

MENO
Then don't you think he knows?

SOCRATES
I don't have a good memory, Meno;
so I can't say now what I thought then.
Wasn't it Gorgias who said
that nothing really exists
nor is anything truly known
nor clearly communicated?
Maybe he did know,
and you know what he said.
So remind me how he said it,
or if you wish, tell me yourself;
for I assume you think as he would.

MENO
I do.

SOCRATES
Then let's pass over him, since he isn't here.
Before the gods, Meno,
what do you yourself say virtue is?
Speak and don't refuse,
so that it may be the luckiest lie I ever lied,
if it appears that you and Gorgias know this,
while I said I never met anyone who did.

MENO
It's not hard to say, Socrates.
First, if you want a man's virtue,
it's easy to say that it's being competent
in managing the affairs of the city
to benefit friends and harm enemies
and being careful not to suffer oneself.
If you want a woman's virtue,
it's not hard to go through it,
that she should keep house,
maintain the things inside,
and obey her husband.
And the child has another virtue,
both female and male, and the old another---
one if you like for the free, another for slaves.
And there are many other virtues besides,
so that one can't even say what virtue is about;
for there is a virtue for each activity and age
and for every work of each of us;
and I think it's the same, Socrates, with vice.

SOCRATES
It seems I'm in much luck, Meno,
if in looking for one virtue
I've found a swarm of them laid up by you.
Yet Meno, according to this metaphor of the swarm,
if I asked you what is the essence of the bee,
and you said there are all kinds,
what would you answer if I asked you:
then is it as bees they are all kinds
and differ from each other?
or do they differ not in this but in something else,
such as beauty or size or other things?
What would you say if I asked this?

MENO
I'd say they don't differ as bees from one another.

SOCRATES
So if I said after that:
then you could tell me this
by which they don't differ but are all the same;
what would you say this is?
I assume you would have something to tell me.

MENO
I would.

SOCRATES
So with the virtues,
even if there are all kinds,
they all have this one form
by which they are virtues,
which one has to observe well
to give a clear answer
to that question of what virtue happens to be;
or don't you understand what I mean?

MENO
I think I understand;
yet I'm not grasping the question
as I would like to.

SOCRATES
Does it seem to you, Meno,
that only with virtue,
there's one for a man,
another for a woman and so on,
or is it the same with health
and size and strength?
Is there one health for a man
and another for a woman?
Or wherever there is health is it the same form?

MENO
It seems to me it's the same
for both man and woman.

SOCRATES
Then isn't it so with size and strength too?
If a woman is strong,
won't she be strong in the same strength?
For by "the same" I mean that
strength doesn't differ in a man or a woman;
or do you think there is some difference?

MENO
Not I.

SOCRATES
And will there be
some difference in virtue as virtue,
whether in a child or an elder
or a woman or a man?

MENO
It seems to me somehow, Socrates,
this is no longer similar to the other cases.

SOCRATES
But why?
Didn't you say that a man's virtue is
to manage the city,
and a woman's the household?

MENO
I did.

SOCRATES
So is it possible to manage
either a city or a household or anything else,
without managing prudently and justly?

MENO
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Then both the woman and man
need justice and prudence
if they intend to be good.

MENO
Apparently.

SOCRATES
What about the child and the elder?
Undisciplined and unjust
could they ever become good?

MENO
Of course not.

SOCRATES
But if they are prudent and just?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then all people are good in the same way;
for they become good by the same things.

MENO
Probably.

SOCRATES
I assume if they didn't have the same virtue,
they wouldn't be good in the same way.

MENO
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Then since it's the same virtue for all,
try to recall and say
what Gorgias and you say it is.

MENO
What else could it be
but the ability to govern people?
if you're searching for one thing for all.

SOCRATES
I am searching for that.
Then is virtue the same
in a child and a slave, Meno,
it being the ability to govern a master,
and do you think
the one governing is still a slave?

MENO
Certainly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES
It's not likely, excellent one.
Yet consider this:
you say it's the ability to govern;
shall we add to this "justly and not unjustly"?

MENO
I think so; for justice, Socrates, is virtue.

SOCRATES
Virtue, Meno, or a virtue?

MENO
What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES
As with anything else.
For example, with roundness,
I'd say it's "a shape" and not simply "shape."
I'd say this, because there are also other shapes.

MENO
You'd be correct,
and I say
there are other virtues besides justice.

SOCRATES
What are they?
Tell me, as I'd tell you other shapes,
if you ordered me to,
so you tell me the other virtues.

MENO
Then I think courage is a virtue,
and prudence and wisdom and magnanimity
and all sorts of others.

SOCRATES
Again, Meno, we've experienced the same thing;
we've discovered many virtues
while looking for one,
but not in the same way as now;
but the one which is in them all,
we can't discover.

MENO
I can't find what you're looking for, Socrates,
the one virtue that's in all, as with the others.

SOCRATES
Naturally;
but I'm eager, if possible, to lead us on.
You understand that this is so with everything:
if someone asked you what I just did,
"What is shape, Meno?"
if you said to him that it's roundness,
and he asked you, as I did,
"Is roundness shape or a shape?"
I assume you would say that it's a shape.

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then isn't it because there are other shapes?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
And if he then asked you what kind,
would you tell him?

MENO
I would.

SOCRATES
And would these include
both round and straight shapes?

MENO
They would.

SOCRATES
Then suppose he asked you,
"Meno, what is it that's common
to round and straight and all the rest
which you call shapes,
that's the same in all of them?"
Try to tell me,
so that it'll be practice for you
in answering about virtue.

MENO
No, you tell me, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Do you wish me to grant the favor?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then will you be willing to tell me about virtue?

MENO
I will.

SOCRATES
Then I'm eager, for it's worthwhile.

MENO
It certainly is.

SOCRATES
All right, I'll try to tell you what shape is.
See if you accept this definition of it:
shape is the only thing
which always accompanies color.
Is this enough,
or are you looking for something else?
For I'd be pleased if you defined virtue as well.

MENO
But that's too simple, Socrates.

SOCRATES
What do you mean?

MENO
Because shape according to your definition is
what always accompanies color.
Well, but if someone says he doesn't know color,
any more than he knew about shape,
what do you think you would answer?

SOCRATES
I'd tell the truth;
and if the one asking is wise in disputations,
I'd say, "I made my statement;
and if I'm not right,
your work is to examine the logic and refute it."
But if I was discussing it,
as we are now, as friends,
I'd answer in a more mild and dialectical way,
which not only uses the truth but also those points
the one asked acknowledges are known.
I'll try to do this with you.
Tell me, is there something you call an end?
By this I mean the extremity or limit.

MENO
Yes, I think I understand what you mean.

SOCRATES
In a solid do you call this the surface?

MENO
I do.

SOCRATES
Now you should understand
what I mean by shape.
In every case the shape is where the solid ends;
or more concisely, shape is the limit of a solid.

MENO
But what do you mean by color, Socrates?

SOCRATES
You're overbearing, Meno,
to push an old man to answer,
when you won't remember
what Gorgias said virtue is.

MENO
When you tell me this, Socrates, I'll tell you.

SOCRATES
By your discussion, Meno,
even one blindfolded would know
that you're handsome and still have lovers.

MENO
Why?

SOCRATES
Because you command with words,
like spoiled beauties who tyrannize in their prime.
Also you probably know
I have a weakness for beauty.
So I'll indulge you and answer.

MENO
Please do.

SOCRATES
Would you like me to answer according to Gorgias,
which you could especially follow?

MENO
I'd like that. Why not?

SOCRATES
Then don't you say there are emanations of reality?

MENO
Most definitely.
SOCRATES
Color is the emanation of shapes perceived by sight.

MENO
I think your answer is excellent, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then maybe you'll stay and be initiated,
and not have to go away before the mysteries,
as you said yesterday.

MENO
I'll stay, Socrates,
if you give me many such answers.

SOCRATES
I'm eager and won't quit,
both for your sake and mine.
But now try and fulfill your promise
by telling me about all of virtue, what it is,
and stop making many out of one,
as jokers say when they break something,
but leaving virtue whole and healthy
say what it is.
For you received a model from me.

MENO
Then it seems to me, Socrates,
virtue is, as the poet says,
"to enjoy the beautiful and be able;"
and that I say is virtue---
desiring the beautiful and being able to procure it.

SOCRATES
Then do you mean desiring the beautiful
is desiring the good?

MENO
Definitely.

SOCRATES
Then are some desiring the bad,
but others the good?
Don't you think everyone desires the good?

MENO
No, I don't.

SOCRATES
Do some desire the bad?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Do you mean thinking the bad is good,
or knowing that it's bad, nevertheless desiring it?

MENO
Both, it seems to me.

SOCRATES
Does it seem to you, Meno, that someone
knowing the bad is bad would still desire it?

MENO
Definitely.

SOCRATES
What do you mean by desire? to get it?

MENO
To get it; what else?

SOCRATES
Do they believe the bad benefits those who get it,
or do they know the bad harms those who have it?

MENO
Some believe the bad benefits,
and others know that it harms.

SOCRATES
Do you think those believing the bad benefits
know that the bad is bad?

MENO
No, I certainly don't think they do.

SOCRATES
Then isn't it clear that
those ignorant of the bad don't desire that,
but what they think is good,
though it's really bad;
so that those ignorant of it and thinking it's good
clearly are desiring the good;
or aren't they?

MENO
They probably are.

SOCRATES
But then do those desiring the bad, as you say,
believing that the bad harms those who get it,
know for sure that they'll be harmed by it?

MENO
They must.

SOCRATES
But don't those being harmed
think they're miserable
according to how they're harmed?

MENO
They must too.

SOCRATES
And aren't the miserable unhappy?

MENO
I think so.

SOCRATES
So does anyone want to be miserable and unhappy?

MENO
I don't think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then no one, Meno, wants the bad,
for what else is being miserable
but to desire the bad and get it?

MENO
It's probably true, Socrates;
no one wants the bad.

SOCRATES
Then didn't you just say that virtue is
to want and be able to get the good?

MENO
I did.

SOCRATES
Then isn't wanting this common to all,
and in this no one is better than another?

MENO
Apparently.

SOCRATES
But it's clear that if one is better than another,
one must be better in the ability.

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then by your logic, it seems,
virtue is the ability to procure good things.

MENO
I completely agree, Socrates,
with this view, which you now are taking.

SOCRATES
Let's see if what you're saying is true,
for perhaps you may be right.
Do you say virtue is
being able to procure good things?

MENO
I do.

SOCRATES
Don't you call health and wealth good?

MENO
I also mean acquiring gold and silver
and honors and offices in the state.

SOCRATES
Do you mean any other goods besides these kinds?

MENO
No, I mean all these kinds.

SOCRATES
Well, virtue is acquiring gold and silver,
as Meno, the relative of the great king, says.
Do you add to this justly and piously, Meno,
or does it make no difference to you,
even if someone acquires these unjustly,
do you still call it virtue?

MENO
Of course not, Socrates.

SOCRATES
But vice.

MENO
Of course.

SOCRATES
Then it seems in the procuring,
justice or prudence or holiness
or another part of virtue should be included;
otherwise, it won't be virtue,
even if good things are procured.

MENO
For without these how could it be virtue?

SOCRATES
And is not procuring gold and silver,
when it wouldn't be just,
either for oneself or another,
not virtue and its lack is?

MENO
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Then procuring these kinds of goods is not virtue
any more than the lack of them is,
but it seems whatever comes with justice is virtue,
and everything without it is vice.

MENO
It seems to me it must be as you say.

SOCRATES
Then didn't we say a little while ago
that each of these is a part of virtue---
justice and prudence and all such things?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then are you kidding me, Meno?

MENO
What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES
Because after my begging you
not to break virtue and chop it up,
and giving you a model of how you should answer,
you ignored this,
and told me that virtue is
being able to procure good things with justice;
and do you say this is a part of virtue?

MENO
I do.

SOCRATES
Then it follows from what you admit
that whatever one does
with a part of virtue is virtue;
for you say justice is a part of virtue,
as though you had told what the whole of virtue is.
So it seems to me you should begin again, Meno.
What is virtue, if every action
with a part of virtue may be virtue?
Or do you think one can know a part of virtue
when one doesn't know what virtue itself is?

MENO
No, I don't.

SOCRATES
For you remember
when I answered you about shape,
how we rejected the kind of answer
which tries to answer in terms
still being sought and not yet acknowledged.

MENO
And we rejected it correctly, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then, excellent one, while still seeking
what the whole of virtue is,
one can't make this clear
by answering in terms of a part of it,
or in any other way like that,
but again the same question should be asked,
what you mean by virtue;
or does this mean nothing to you?

MENO
It seems to me you're correct, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then answer again from the beginning:
what do you and your friend say virtue is?

MENO
Socrates, I heard before I associated with you
that you yourself are in doubt
and make others doubt;
and now, it seems to me, you're bewitching me
and simply casting spells
so that I'm full of doubt;
and I entirely believe, if I must joke,
that you're most like a stingray in the sea.
For it stings anyone coming near and touching it;
and now I think you've done
something like this to me.
For truly my soul and mouth are numb,
and I don't have any answer for you.
Yet I've given hundreds of speeches on virtue
to many people, and quite good ones, as I thought;
but now I have absolutely nothing to say.
And I think you're well advised not to sail abroad;
for if you did this as a stranger in another city,
you'd quickly be arrested as a wizard.

SOCRATES
You're a rogue, Meno, and almost deceived me.

MENO
What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES
I know the reason why you compared me.

MENO
Why do you think?

SOCRATES
So that I'd compare you back.
I know all the handsome ones like to do this;
for the comparisons of the beautiful are beautiful.
But I won't return the compliment.
If I the stinger am numbed also
in making others numb,
then I admit I'm like that, but not otherwise.
For not being certain myself I make others doubt,
but doubting more than all I make others doubt too.
And now about virtue, I don't know what it is,
yet you who maybe knew before you contacted me,
nevertheless now don't know either.
Yet I'm willing to consider this with you
and inquire into what it is.

MENO
In what way will you search for this, Socrates,
when you don't know what it is at all?
Even if you luck into it,
how will you know that is what you don't know?

SOCRATES
I understand what you wish to say, Meno.
Do you see how you're introducing
a quarrelsome argument,
how no one can search for what
they know or don't know?
For they wouldn't search for what they know,
since they know it and don't need to look for it;
neither would they for what they don't know,
since they don't know what they're looking for.

MENO
Then don't you think this logic is right, Socrates?

SOCRATES
No, I don't.

MENO
Do you have a way of explaining it?

SOCRATES
I do;
for I've heard from wise men and women
about divine things---

MENO
What did they say?

SOCRATES
The truth, I think, and it's beautiful.

MENO
What was it, and who was saying it?

SOCRATES
They were priests and priestesses
who took care about being able
to give an account of their ministry;
also Pindar and other poets who are divine say it.
And what they say is this:
and consider if you think they tell the truth.
For they say the human soul is immortal,
and at one time it ends, which is called dying,
and then it's born again, but it never perishes;
for this reason one should live life as most holy.
For those whom
"Persephone receives in punishment of ancient sin,
in the ninth year she returns the souls again
to the sun above, and from them come noble kings
and men strong and swift and great in wisdom;
and for the rest of time they're called
sacred heroes among humankind."
So the soul being immortal and born many times,
and having seen all things both here and in Hades,
there is nothing which she hasn't learned;
so that it's no wonder she can recollect
both about virtue and other things,
which she also knew before.
For since all of nature is related,
and the soul has learned everything,
nothing prevents it in recollecting one thing alone,
which people call learning,
from discovering everything else,
if one is courageous and doesn't quit searching;
since to search and learn is all of recollection.
Thus one shouldn't follow this quarrelsome argument;
for it would make us lazy,
and to hear it is pleasant only to cowardly people,
but the other makes us energetic and inquiring;
and trusting this to be true
I intend to inquire with you into what virtue is.

MENO
Yes, Socrates;
but what do you mean we don't learn,
and what we call learning is recollection?
Can you teach me how this is?

SOCRATES
I just said, Meno, that you're a rogue,
and now you ask if I can teach you,
when I said it's not teaching but recollection,
so that immediately
I may appear to contradict myself.

MENO
By God, Socrates, I didn't notice that,
but I said it out of habit.
But if you can show me that it's as you say, do so.

SOCRATES
It's not easy,
but I'm willing and eager for your sake.
But call your attendant over
so that I can show you.

MENO
Certainly.
Come over here.

Meno calls the BOY, who stands up and walks over, standing by Meno who is sitting on the bench. Socrates stands up and with a stick draws in the sand a square with sides of nearly two feet.

SOCRATES
Is he Greek, and does he speak Greek?

MENO
Most definitely, home-born.

SOCRATES
Pay attention whether it appears to you
whether he is recollecting or learning from me.

MENO
I will.

Socrates speaks to the boy.

SOCRATES
Do you know that a space such as this is a square?

BOY
I do.

SOCRATES
So does a square space have four equal sides?

BOY
Certainly.

Socrates draws a cross bisecting each side.

SOCRATES
Aren't these drawn through the middle equal too?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then couldn't a space like this be larger or smaller?

BOY
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So if this side were two feet and that one two,
how many feet would the whole be?
Consider it this way:
if this side is two feet and that only one foot,
would it be two feet taken one time?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
But since it's two feet on that side,
is it twice two feet?

BOY
It is.

SOCRATES
So how many is twice two feet?
Count and tell me.

The boy counts the four internal squares.

BOY
Four, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then could there be another space twice this one,
and having all sides equal like this one?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
So how many feet will it be?

BOY
Eight.

SOCRATES
Now try to tell me
how long each side of that will be.
This one is two feet;
what about the one that's double?

BOY
It's clear, Socrates, that it'll be double.

SOCRATES
Do you see, Meno,
how I'm not teaching anything,
but asking everything?
And now he thinks he knows how long
the side of an eight-foot square is, doesn't he?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
So does he know?

MENO
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Doesn't he think so from the doubling?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Watch how he recollects in order,
as one should recollect.

Socrates speaks now to the boy.

SOCRATES (Cont'd.)
You tell me, do you say
a double space comes from the double side?
I don't mean with one long and the other short,
but with all sides equal like this one,
but double this, an eight-foot square;
see if you still think it will be from the double.

BOY
I do.

SOCRATES
Then isn't this line doubled
by adding another of the same length here?

BOY
Certainly.

SOCRATES
From this do you say it'll be an eight-foot space,
from four sides like this?

BOY
Yes.

Socrates draws the square with four feet on each side.

SOCRATES
Let's draw the four equal sides of this.
Is this what you say would be an eight-foot square?

BOY
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then in this aren't there four squares,
each of which is equal to the four-foot square?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
So how much is it?
Isn't it four times this?

BOY
How could it not be?

SOCRATES
So is four times this, double?

BOY
No, by God.

SOCRATES
How many times is it?

BOY
Four times.

SOCRATES
Then from the double, boy, comes not double,
but four times the space.

BOY
That's true.

SOCRATES
For four times four is sixteen, isn't it?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
From how long a side comes the eight-foot square?
Doesn't four times come from this one?

BOY
I'd say so.

SOCRATES
And does a four-foot square come from a side of half?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
Well, isn't an eight-foot
double this and half of that?
Won't it be longer than this side
and shorter than that?

BOY
I think so.

SOCRATES
Right;
just answer what you think.
Now tell me,
isn't this side two feet and that one four?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then the side of the eight-foot square should be
more than two feet and less than four.

BOY
It should.
SOCRATES
Try to tell me how long you think it is.

BOY
Three feet.

As he speaks, Socrates draws the two remaining sides for a square with three feet on each side.

SOCRATES
Then if it's three feet,
shall we add half to this one, so it'll be three?
Here are two, and this is one;
and the same way on this side, two and one;
and you say this is the square.

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then if it's three feet here and three feet here,
is the whole square three times three feet?

BOY
Apparently.

SOCRATES
How many is three times three feet?

BOY
Nine.

SOCRATES
And how many feet should the double one be?

BOY
Eight.

SOCRATES
Then the eight-foot square
doesn't come from three-foot sides?

BOY
Of course not.

SOCRATES
But from how many?
Try to tell us exactly;
and if you don't want to figure it,
show how much.

BOY
But by God, Socrates, I don't know.

SOCRATES
Do you notice, Meno,
he's already moving to recollection?
Because at first he didn't know
what the side of an eight-foot square is,
just as he doesn't know now,
but then he thought he knew
and confidently answered as though he did,
and didn't believe he was in doubt;
but now already he believes he's in doubt,
and though he doesn't know,
he doesn't think he does.

MENO
You tell the truth.

SOCRATES
Then isn't he better off now
about the matter he doesn't know?

MENO
I think he is.

SOCRATES
So making him doubt and numb, like the stingray,
have we done him any harm?

MENO
I don't think so.

SOCRATES
At least we've done him some service, it seems,
toward discovering how it is;
for now he'll inquire gladly not knowing,
but then he easily thought he was right
in telling many people often
about doubling a square by doubling one side.

MENO
Probably.

SOCRATES
So do you think he'd attempt
to inquire or learn this,
which he thought he knew and didn't,
until he had fallen into doubt
believing he didn't know,
and longing to know?

MENO
I don't think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then did he benefit from the stingray?

MENO
I think so.

SOCRATES
Consider that from this doubt
he'll discover by inquiring with me,
merely by my asking and not teaching;
and guard against his discovering
by me teaching or explaining to him,
and not from questioning his opinions.

Socrates erases the drawings and draws again a square with two-foot sides, then turns to the boy.

SOCRATES (Cont'd.)
Now you tell me:
isn't this a four-foot square?
Do you understand?

BOY
I do.

As he speaks, Socrates adds three more similar squares to make another square with four-foot sides.

SOCRATES
And here are we adding another square equal to it?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
And a third equal to each of those?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then shall we fill up this space in the corner?

BOY
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So would this be four equal squares?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
So how many times each one is this whole?

BOY
Four times.

SOCRATES
But it should be twice, or don't you remember?

BOY
Certainly.

Socrates draws diagonal lines in each of the four smaller squares so as to make another square inside the larger one.

SOCRATES
Then doesn't this side drawn from corner to corner
cut in half each of these squares?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then aren't these four equal sides forming this square?

BOY
They are.

SOCRATES
Now consider: how large is this square?

BOY
I don't understand.

SOCRATES
Doesn't each of these four sides inside
cut off half of each of these squares?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
So how much is in each of these squares?

BOY
Four.

Socrates points to one of the triangles formed on the inside.

SOCRATES
And how much here?

BOY
Two.

SOCRATES
And what is four to two?

BOY
Double.

Socrates traces the diagonal square on the inside.

SOCRATES
So how many feet is this square?

BOY
Eight.

SOCRATES
From which line?

The boy points to one of the diagonal lines.

BOY
From this.

SOCRATES
From the ones drawn from corner to corner
across the four-foot squares?

BOY
Yes.

SOCRATES
The professors call this a diagonal;
so if it's name is a diagonal, from the diagonal,
as you, Meno's boy, say, comes the double square.

BOY
It certainly does, Socrates.

Socrates sits down again on the bench next to Meno, and the boy goes back to where he was sitting.

SOCRATES
What do you think, Meno?
Was there any opinion
he didn't answer by himself?

MENO
No, they were his.

SOCRATES
And he didn't know, as we said, a little while ago.

MENO
You tell the truth.

SOCRATES
Yet these opinions were in him, weren't they?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then may one who doesn't know about anything
have inside true opinions about what is not known?

MENO
Apparently.

SOCRATES
And now like a dream
those opinions have just been stirred up in him;
But if one asks the same things
often and in many ways,
you can tell that in the end one will know
no less accurately than anyone about these things.

MENO
Probably.

SOCRATES
Then being taught by no one,
but only by questioning,
will one know,
receiving knowledge out of oneself?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Isn't this recovery of knowledge
in oneself recollection?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then the knowledge which he now has,
either was acquired at some time
or he always had it.

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then if he always had it,
he was always knowing;
but if he acquired it at some time,
he couldn't have acquired it in this life.
Or has anyone taught him geometry?

MENO
He's been in my house all his life,
and I know no one has taught him.

SOCRATES
But he does have these opinions, doesn't he?

MENO
It appears he must, Socrates.

SOCRATES
If he didn't acquire them in this life,
isn't it now clear that he had them
and learned them at some other time?

MENO
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Then was this time when he wasn't this person?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
So if in the time when he was and wasn't a person,
he had these true opinions in him,
which by questioning are awakened into knowledge,
then will his soul have understood them always?

MENO
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Then if the truth of reality is always in the soul,
would the soul be immortal,
and so should you be confident that
whatever you may not happen to know now,
which you don't remember,
you should attempt to search for it to recollect it?

MENO
I think you're right, Socrates,
but I don't know how.

SOCRATES
I think so too, Meno.
I certainly don't rely
on some points of the argument;
but in thinking that
by inquiring into what we don't know
we'll be better and braver and less idle
than if we think it's not possible
to discover what we don't know,
on this point I would certainly fight,
as best I could, both in argument and action.

MENO
I think you're right on that, Socrates.

SOCRATES
So if you wish, since you agree
about inquiring into what one doesn't know,
shall we attempt together
to inquire into what virtue is?

MENO
Certainly.
Yet, Socrates, I'd still like to ask
whether virtue can be taught
or comes by nature or by some other way.

SOCRATES
If I governed not only myself but you, Meno,
we wouldn't consider
whether virtue can be taught or not,
before first inquiring into what it is;
but since you don't attempt to govern yourself,
so that you may be free,
you attempt to govern me;
but I'll go along with you;
for what should I do?
So if without knowing what it is
we're going to ask if virtue is taught,
then we should use a hypothesis, as geometricians do.
In other words, what must virtue be,
if it's teachable?
First if something is like knowledge,
then is it taught, or as we just said, remembered?
Is it clear to all that only knowledge can be taught?

MENO
I think so.

SOCRATES
If virtue is knowledge,
it's clear it may be taught.
MENO
How could it not be?

SOCRATES
Next we should consider
if virtue is knowledge or not.
Surely we say virtue is good,
and does this hypothesis remain that it's good?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then if anything is good apart from knowledge,
virtue may not be knowledge;
but if nothing is good without knowledge,
then our hypothesis may be correct.
And is it by virtue we're good?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then virtue is beneficial, isn't it?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Let's consider what is beneficial to us.
We say health and strength and beauty and wealth.
But sometimes these are harmful;
or would you say otherwise?

MENO
No, I agree.

SOCRATES
Then aren't they beneficial when used correctly,
and harmful when not?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then let's consider qualities of the soul:
what you call prudence, justice, courage,
aptitude, memory, magnanimity, and all the rest.
Which of these don't you think are knowledge,
if sometimes they harm and other times benefit?
May courage without thought be rash and so harmful?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
And the same with prudence and aptitude:
are things learned with intelligence beneficial,
but without intelligence are they harmful?

MENO
Definitely.

SOCRATES
Then does everything undertaken
by the soul thoughtfully
end in happiness, but thoughtlessly the opposite?

MENO
Probably.

SOCRATES
Then if virtue is something in the soul
and must be beneficial, it should be thoughtfulness,
since all the soul qualities in themselves
are neither beneficial nor harmful
unless thoughtfulness is added.
According to this logic
virtue being beneficial should be thoughtfulness.

MENO
It seems so.

SOCRATES
Are the others we just mentioned,
wealth and such things,
as good sometimes and harmful other times
beneficial to the soul when thoughtful
and harmful when thoughtless?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Are the thoughtful guided correctly
but not the foolish?

MENO
That's so.

SOCRATES
Then it's said of all,
that in a person all things depend on the soul,
and the soul on thoughtfulness,
if they're to be good;
and by this logic
thoughtfulness would be beneficial,
and do we say virtue is the beneficial?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then is virtue completely or partly thoughtfulness?

MENO
I think the argument is right, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then if this is so, people are not good by nature.

MENO
It doesn't seem like it.

SOCRATES
For if they were good by nature,
we could select the good ones when they're young
and keep them safe until they come of age
when they could be useful to the state.

MENO
That's likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES
So since the good don't become good by nature,
then is it by learning?

MENO
That's clear from the hypothesis,
if virtue is knowledge, it must be taught.

SOCRATES
Maybe, by God;
but what if we weren't right
in agreeing to that?

MENO
It seemed right just now.

SOCRATES
But it should be right for not only a moment,
but now and in the future,
if it's going to be something sound.

MENO
Why are you making it difficult
and distrust that virtue is knowledge?

SOCRATES
I'll tell you, Meno.
For I don't retract the statement
that it's taught, if it's knowledge;
but consider whether
I could distrust if it's knowledge.
For tell me:
if anything is teachable, not only virtue,
must not there be teachers and students of it?

MENO
I think so;
but don't you think
there are teachers of virtue?

ANYTUS approaches and sits down next to Socrates.

SOCRATES
Often I've inquired if there are,
but doing all that
I haven't been able to find any.
But now it's lucky for us
that Anytus sat down here
so that he may join us in the inquiry.
For first Anytus is the son of a wealthy father;
he's a well-respected general who's not overbearing;
and he raised and educated his son so well
that Athenians have selected him for great offices.
Tell us, Anytus, if Meno wants to study virtue,
should he go to those professing to teach it?

ANYTUS
Who do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES
People call them sophists.

ANYTUS
In the name of Heracles, Socrates,
it would be crazy to go to them,
for they corrupt those who associate with them.

SOCRATES
But Anytus,
they accept fees for making people good.
I know that Protagoras
has made more money this way
than the great sculptor Pheidias.
Do the sophists knowingly corrupt the youth?
Do you think they are as crazy as that?

ANYTUS
Crazy, Socrates, not them, but those who pay them.

SOCRATES
Has any sophist wronged you, Anytus?
Why are you so hard on them?

ANYTUS
By God, I've never associated with any of them.

SOCRATES
If you've had absolutely no experience with them,
how do you know whether they're good or ruinous?

ANYTUS
Easily; I know who they are.

SOCRATES
Perhaps you're a seer, Anytus;
but tell us to whom Meno should go
to become virtuous.

ANYTUS
Why don't you tell him?

SOCRATES
I did, but you don't seem to agree with me.
You take your turn, and give us a name.

ANYTUS
Any good Athenian will be better than the sophists.

SOCRATES
Did these Athenians become good automatically
without learning from anyone,
and can they teach what they haven't learned?

ANYTUS
I imagine they learned from their predecessors;
or don't you think there are
many good men in the city?

SOCRATES
I do, Anytus,
but which are good teachers of virtue?
Were Themistocles, Aristeides and Pericles good?

ANYTUS
I'd say so.

SOCRATES
Though they may have trained their sons
in music and gymnastics and horsemanship,
did any of their sons excel in virtue?
If virtue were teachable,
surely they would have found someone
who could have made their sons good.
But, my friend, virtue may not be teachable.

ANYTUS
Socrates, you speak ill of people too easily.
So if you'll be persuaded by me,
I advise you to be careful.
Perhaps it's easier to do wrong to people than good,
especially here, and I think you know that.

Anytus angrily stands up and walks away.

SOCRATES
Meno, it seems to me Anytus is angry,
and I'm not surprised;
for he thinks
I'm speaking ill of these people and himself.
But if he ever learns what "speaking ill" means,
he'll stop being angry;
but now he's ignorant.
Well, Meno,
do you know any professors of virtue?

MENO
Not really.

SOCRATES
What about the sophists?

MENO
I admire Gorgias,
but you never hear him promising that,
and he laughs at those who do promise it;
he thinks he should make speakers smart.
Like many,
I don't know if sophists can teach virtue.

SOCRATES
The poets also seem to be in doubt about this,
for Theognis says that by associating with the good
the lessons of the good may be absorbed,
but with the bad intelligence may be lost;
but later he doubts that understanding may be created
and says,
"Not by teaching do you make a bad man good."
Do you know any other subject where there is
so much confusion and doubt
as to whether it's taught,
and can we say there really are teachers of virtue?

MENO
By God, I can't.

SOCRATES
And if there are no teachers,
then are there students?

MENO
Apparently not.

SOCRATES
Then can virtue be taught?

MENO
Probably not,
but I wonder how people become good.

SOCRATES
Maybe people don't need knowledge to be good.
Perhaps our agreement was not correct that
the right guidance toward making anything beneficial
must come from knowledge.

MENO
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
I'll tell you.
Whoever knows the right way to Larisa
could give correct guidance, right?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
But couldn't also someone with the right opinion
give correct guidance too,
even without knowledge?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then true opinion will be as good a guide
to correct action as knowledge is,
and virtue may be guided by this just as well.

MENO
Except, Socrates, knowledge will always be right,
but correct opinion may or may not be.

SOCRATES
But how could a correct opinion not be correct?

MENO
Apparently it must, but I wonder, Socrates,
why knowledge is more valued
than correct opinion.

SOCRATES
Because right opinions,
like the statues of Daedalus,
are not tied down and are likely to run away,
but knowledge fastens things down
with causal reasoning,
which is the recollection we agreed upon before.
And I'm not guessing about this,
for the difference between
correct opinion and knowledge
is not merely an opinion with me
but one of the few things I would say I know.

MENO
And you're correct, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Am I also correct that
true opinion is just as effective
in guiding toward good action as knowledge
and just as beneficial,
so that one with true opinion
may be considered virtuous
and useful to one's country?

MENO
Yes.

SOCRATES
Since both knowledge and true opinion are acquired,
can we say that either of them comes by nature?

MENO
No.

SOCRATES
Then if virtue can't be taught,
because there are no teachers of it,
then is virtue thoughtfulness after all?

MENO
Apparently not.

SOCRATES
But does it correctly guide one to what is beneficial?

MENO
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And two things guide one to what is beneficial,
knowledge and correct opinion.
But if virtue isn't knowledge,
could anything else but correct opinion
have guided politicians to beneficial actions?

MENO
No.

SOCRATES
Then the virtue or correct opinion of politicians
is no different than the prophets' or diviners',
for they don't understand what they say.

MENO
That's probably so.

SOCRATES
Then we may call divine not only prophets and poets,
but politicians who are inspired and possessed by God
when they speak correctly about great things,
not knowing what they're saying.

MENO
Certainly, though Anytus may object to the statement.

SOCRATES
I don't care.
We'll discuss that another time.
Now by this logic we have inquired well
and said that virtue is neither natural nor taught,
but comes from divine providence
without understanding,
unless a politician could make another politician so.

MENO
I think you're right, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then from this reasoning, Meno,
it appears that virtue
comes to us by inspiration from divine providence,
but how this occurs we'll never know
until we attempt to inquire into what virtue is.
Now it's time for me to go,
but you talk to Anytus
about what you've been persuaded,
so that he may be gentler;
and if you convince him,
you will benefit Athens.

-end-

Copyright 1996, 2008 by Sanderson Beck

SOCRATES: A Series of Philosophical Plays is now published as a book. For ordering information, please click here.

SOCRATES
"Know Yourself"
The Sophists
Prudence and Courage
The Lover
The Banquet
Inspiration
Rhetoric
Justice
The Good
The Trial
Prison and Death

Introduction to Socrates and Plato
ALCIBIADES by Plato
APOLOGIA SOKRATOUS (DEFENSE OF SOCRATES) by Plato
CRITO by Plato
PHAEDO by Plato

The Socratic Problem
Life of Socrates
Attitudes of Socrates
How Socrates Taught
What Socrates Taught
Did Socrates Practice It?
Influence of Socrates

BECK index