BECK index

SOCRATES
"Know Yourself"

by Sanderson Beck
based on Plato's Alcibiades I and Alcibiades II

SOCRATES: A Series of Philosophical Plays is now published as a book. For ordering information, please click here.

Characters:

Alcibiades
Socrates

Scene: An open plaza in daytime near the porch of the King Archon
in Athens 432 BC. SOCRATES approaches ALCIBIADES cautiously.

SOCRATES
Alcibiades, I think you may be surprised,
since I am the first of all your lovers,
and they have all quit,
that I am the only one who hasn't left you;
and while they crowded around to converse with you,
I haven't spoken to you at all for years.

ALCIBIADES
I know.

SOCRATES
The reason for this is not anything human,
but a certain divine opposition,
whose power you shall hear of later;
but now that it opposes me no longer, I have come;
and I hope it will not oppose anymore.
So nearby I have been observing you during this time
considering how you respond to the lovers;
for though they were many and high-minded,
overcome by your spirit they fled from you.
I'd like to explain why.

ALCIBIADES
All right.

SOCRATES
You say you don't need anyone for anything;
for your advantages are so great you lack nothing,
starting from the body and ending with the soul.
For you think first that you are the most handsome,
which is plain for all to see,
and second that you are from the most noble family
in Athens, the greatest city in Greece,
and through your parents you have the best people
as your friends and relations,
who in case of need would assist you;
and you count on an even greater advantage in Pericles,
whom your father left behind as guardian
for you and your brother,
who not only does whatever he likes in the city,
but in all of Greece and in many foreign countries.
I should also add the wealth of your estate,
but you seem to presume least on this.

ALCIBIADES
I admit that I am well-endowed, Socrates.

SOCRATES
So boasting of all these advantages
you have overcome the weaker lovers,
and none of this has escaped your notice;
so I'm sure you're wondering why on earth
I haven't given up my love for you,
and what hope I might have in remaining
when all the others have fled away.

ALCIBIADES
Perhaps, Socrates, you don't know you anticipated me;
for I've had it in mind to ask you the same thing:
what do you want and why do you keep bothering me
by making sure you are wherever I happen to be?
I really do wonder what your purpose is,
and I would like to hear about it.

SOCRATES
Then you will listen to me attentively,
if, as you say, you want to know what I mean,
and you will stay around listening to what I say.

ALCIBIADES
Certainly; only speak.

SOCRATES
Look, it wouldn't be surprising
if I have trouble stopping,
since I had so much trouble getting started.

ALCIBIADES
My happy friend, speak; for I will listen.

SOCRATES
I will, though it's hard for a lover to come near
a man who does not yield to lovers,
but nevertheless I must try to say what I mean.
For Alcibiades, if I saw you were content
with the advantages I just described
and were willing to spend your life with these,
long ago I would have left off the love,
or so at least I persuade myself;
but now I shall allege other thoughts to you,
from which you'll know how attentive I have been.
For it seems to me, if some god should ask you,
"Alcibiades, do you wish to live with what you have,
or to die now if you're not allowed to gain more?"
It seems to me you would choose to die;
but now what your ambition in life is, I shall say.
You believe if you come before the Athenian democracy,
and this would be in a very few days,
there you will point out to the Athenians
that you are more worthy of honor
than either Pericles or anyone else who's ever existed,
and having pointed this out to them,
you will have the greatest power in the state,
and if you are the greatest here,
then you are also among the other Greeks,
and not only among Greeks but also among foreigners,
who inhabit the same continent with us.
And if this same god said you may have power in Europe,
but you will not be permitted to cross over into Asia
nor to interfere with the affairs there,
I think you wouldn't want to live on those terms either,
if you are not to fill the whole world,
as one might say, with your name and your power.
That you have this hope, I am sure and am not guessing.
So perhaps you would say, since you know this is true,
"What does this have to do with your argument, Socrates?"
I'm going to tell you, my friend.
For the goal of all your purposes
is impossible for you to set without me;
such is the power I think I have
over you and your affairs;
for this reason the god didn't allow me to talk to you,
while I was waiting around for when it would be allowed.
For as you hope to prove yourself
to be most worthy in the state,
and having proven no one else is, you will be powerful;
so I hope to be more powerful proving my value to you,
that neither guardian nor relative nor anyone else
can give you the power you set for yourself except me,
with the god's help of course.
When you were younger and didn't have such hopes,
it seems to me the god didn't allow the conversation
so that I wouldn't be conversing with you in vain;
but now he commands it; for now you'll listen to me.

ALCIBIADES
Now, Socrates, you appear to me
even more extraordinary in beginning to speak
than when you followed me in silence;
although even then you looked strange enough.
So as to my intending these things or not,
probably you have already decided;
and if I denied it,
you wouldn't be persuaded by me anyway.
But if I do really intend these things,
how are you the only one who can make it happen for me?
What do you have to say?

SOCRATES
If you're asking me to make a long speech
like you're used to hearing, such is not my way;
but I think I could prove it to you,
if you are willing to do me one small service.

ALCIBIADES
If the service you mean is not hard, I'm willing.

SOCRATES
Does it seem hard to answer questions?

ALCIBIADES
That's not hard.

SOCRATES
Then answer.

ALCIBIADES
Ask.

SOCRATES
Then I ask if you have these intentions I've described.

ALCIBIADES
Let it be so, if you wish,
so that I may also know what you will ask.

SOCRATES
Well then, you do intend, as I say, in not too long
to come forward to advise the Athenians;
what if when you were about to go up on the platform,
I were to take hold of you and ask, "Alcibiades,
since you're intending to advise the Athenians,
about what are you standing up to advise them?
So is it about something you know better than they?"
What would you answer?

ALCIBIADES
I would say, "Of course,
about what I know better than they."

SOCRATES
About what you happen to know, you're a good adviser.

ALCIBIADES
Why not?

SOCRATES
Then you know only the things
you've learned from others or discovered yourself?

ALCIBIADES
How else could I know?

SOCRATES
So is it possible that
you could ever learn or discover something
if you weren't willing to learn or inquire yourself?

ALCIBIADES
It is not.

SOCRATES
But what? Would you have been willing
to inquire or learn what you thought you knew?

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Then what you happen to know now,
was there a time when you didn't believe you knew it?

ALCIBIADES
There must have been.

SOCRATES
But what you have learned, I also know pretty well;
You studied, as I recall, writing, harp and wrestling;
for you weren't willing to learn flute;
this is what you know,
unless somehow you learned something without my noticing.

ALCIBIADES
I have had no other lessons than these.

SOCRATES
So is it when the Greeks are being advised about writing,
that then you will stand up to advise them?

ALCIBIADES
By God, not I.

SOCRATES
But is it when it's about notes on the lyre?

ALCIBIADES
Not at all.

SOCRATES
Nor are they used to being advised about wrestling.

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
So when they are being advised about what?
For surely it's not when it's about building?

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
For a builder will advise on this better than you.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Nor will it be when they're asking about divination?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
For on this a diviner is better than you.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Whether small or large, beautiful or ugly, rich or poor.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
For I think concerning each issue
the advice comes from the knowledgeable,
and not from the wealthy.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And whether the one counseling is a worker or wealthy,
would make no difference to the Athenians,
when they're being advised about the health of citizens,
they would seek a physician to be the adviser.

ALCIBIADES
Naturally.

SOCRATES
So what will they be considering when you stand up
so that you'll be correct in offering to advise them?

ALCIBIADES
When it's about their own affairs, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Do you mean what kind of ships they should build?

ALCIBIADES
Not I, Socrates.

SOCRATES
For I don't think you know how to build ships.
Is this the reason or is it something else?

ALCIBIADES
That's the reason.

SOCRATES
Then about which of their affairs do you mean to advise?

ALCIBIADES
About war, Socrates, or peace or other affairs of state.

SOCRATES
Then do you mean when they're being advised
with whom they should make peace
and on whom they should make war and in what way?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
So if the Athenians were to be advised
with whom they should wrestle close
and with whom at arm's length and in what way,
would you or a gymnastic trainer be a better adviser?

ALCIBIADES
A gymnastic trainer, of course.

SOCRATES
And this art we would call gymnastics.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Can you tell me what is the art which includes
playing the harp and singing and dancing?

ALCIBIADES
Not now.

SOCRATES
Try it this way: who are the goddesses of the art?

ALCIBIADES
Do you mean the Muses, Socrates?

SOCRATES
I do. So now look: what is the art named after them?

ALCIBIADES
I think you mean music.

SOCRATES
I do mean it. So by what art
are singing, playing harp and dancing done correctly?

ALCIBIADES
It seems to me by music.

SOCRATES
You're right.
So now as wrestling is done better by gymnastics
and these are done better by music,
by what are war and maintaining peace done better?

ALCIBIADES
I have no idea.

SOCRATES
But that's disgraceful, Alcibiades,
if you don't know by what art you're to advise
on those matters which you claim to know.
Consider then and tell me what does "better" refer to
in maintaining peace and in making war when necessary?

ALCIBIADES
But in considering it, I'm not able to understand.

SOCRATES
Don't you know when we make war
we charge each other with what we're suffering,
and what we name it when we do go into war?

ALCIBIADES
I do, that someone deceived or violated or cheated.

SOCRATES
You have it; how are each of these suffered?
Try to say how one or the other is different.

ALCIBIADES
Do you mean by this, Socrates, justly or unjustly?

SOCRATES
The same.

ALCIBIADES
But this makes all the difference in the world.

SOCRATES
So do you advise the Athenians
to go to war on the just or on the unjust?

ALCIBIADES
That's tricky, for even if someone decides
it's necessary to make war on those acting justly,
one wouldn't admit it.

SOCRATES
For that's not lawful, as is fitting.

ALCIBIADES
Of course not; nor does it seem to be honorable.

SOCRATES
Then will you appeal to such ideas
when you make your speeches?

ALCIBIADES
Necessarily.

SOCRATES
So the art by which warring or not is done better
happens to be justice, or isn't it?

ALCIBIADES
It appears to be.

SOCRATES
But my dear Alcibiades, have you overlooked
the fact that you don't know this,
or have I overlooked
your having learned it in school from a teacher
who taught you to discern the just and unjust.
Tell me who it is so that I may be his pupil too.

ALCIBIADES
You're mocking, Socrates.

SOCRATES
No, by our common god of Friendship, tell me who it is.

ALCIBIADES
But what if I can't?
Don't you think I could know
about justice and injustice in any other way?

SOCRATES
Yes, if you could discover it.

ALCIBIADES
But don't you believe I could discover it.

SOCRATES
Very much, if you inquired.

ALCIBIADES
Then don't you think I might inquire?

SOCRATES
I do, if you thought you didn't know.

ALCIBIADES
Then wasn't there a time when I was that way?

SOCRATES
You're right. Therefore you need to tell me
when you didn't think you knew the just and unjust?
Was it a year ago or even three or four years back?
Tell the truth so that the discussion won't be in vain.

ALCIBIADES
I did think I knew.

SOCRATES
And before that you were a child,
and even then I know well that you thought you knew.

ALCIBIADES
How do you know this?

SOCRATES
Often I heard you when playing dice or a children's game,
how you had no doubt about the just and unjust,
but spoke very loudly and confidently about what occurred,
how a child was bad and unjust and was thus doing wrong;
or am I not speaking the truth?

ALCIBIADES
But what was I to do, Socrates, when someone cheated me?

SOCRATES
But if you were ignorant whether you were wronged then,
how could you even ask, "What was I to do?"

ALCIBIADES
But by God, I wasn't ignorant,
and I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

SOCRATES
So you thought you knew even as a child what was just.

ALCIBIADES
I did; and I did know.

SOCRATES
In what time period did you discover it?
For it certainly wasn't when you thought you knew.

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
So consider, when did you believe you were ignorant?

ALCIBIADES
By God, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

SOCRATES
Then you don't know these things by discovering them.

ALCIBIADES
Apparently not.

SOCRATES
But you just said you don't know them by learning;
so if you neither discovered nor learned,
how do you know and from where?

ALCIBIADES
Perhaps my answer that I discovered it wasn't correct.
I learned it, I think, like the others.

SOCRATES
Again we have the same argument. From whom?

ALCIBIADES
From many people.

SOCRATES
You don't take refuge in serious teachers in the many.

ALCIBIADES
Why not? Aren't they capable of teaching?

SOCRATES
Not even how to play checkers well,
though I think this is trivial compared to justice.
If they can't teach the trivial,
how can they teach the serious?

ALCIBIADES
I think they teach things more serious than checkers.

SOCRATES
Like what?

ALCIBIADES
For example, I learned to speak Greek from them;
I couldn't say who my teacher was,
but I attribute it to those
you say aren't serious teachers.

SOCRATES
But many may be good teachers of this
and be praised for it.

ALCIBIADES
Why?

SOCRATES
Because they have the knowledge they need
to be good teachers of these things.
Don't the knowledgeable agree with each other?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But if they differ on something,
would you say they know it?

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Then how could they teach it?

ALCIBIADES
They couldn't.

SOCRATES
Do you think many differ on what stone or wood is?
For isn't this what you mean
by knowing how to speak Greek.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Do they agree in private and in public on these terms?

ALCIBIADES
They do.

SOCRATES
Then very likely they'll be good teachers of this.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But if we wanted to know
not only what people or horses are,
but also which of them are good runners,
then would many still be capable of teaching this?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
And do you have adequate proof that they don't know
and that they're not proficient teachers of this,
since they don't agree about it themselves?

ALCIBIADES
I do.

SOCRATES
Now then concerning just and unjust people and business
do you find that many agree with each other?

ALCIBIADES
Not in the least, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Do they differ very much on these points?

ALCIBIADES
Very much.

SOCRATES
Then I don't think you've ever seen or heard of
people differing so seriously about health
so as to fight because of it and kill each other.

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
But on issues of justice and injustice I'm sure you have,
even if you haven't seen it, then from history or Homer.

ALCIBIADES
I certainly have, Socrates.

SOCRATES
So are those knowledgeable who differ so seriously,
that they oppose each other to the utmost extreme?

ALCIBIADES
Apparently not.

SOCRATES
Then are you referring to such teachers,
whom you admit yourself don't know.

ALCIBIADES
It's likely.

SOCRATES
So how is it likely that you know the just and unjust,
about which you appear to be so confused
and haven't learned from anyone nor discovered yourself?

ALCIBIADES
From what you're saying it's not likely.

SOCRATES
Again do you see how you're being unfair, Alcibiades,
in that you're saying it's me saying these things?

ALCIBIADES
Aren't you saying how I don't know about the just?

SOCRATES
Definitely not.

ALCIBIADES
But am I?

SOCRATES
Yes.

ALCIBIADES
How so?

SOCRATES
If I ask you between one and two, which is more,
won't you say that it's two?

ALCIBIADES
I shall.

SOCRATES
By how much?

ALCIBIADES
By one.

SOCRATES
So which of us is saying two is one more than one?

ALCIBIADES
I am.

SOCRATES
Then I was asking, and you were answering?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
So am I, the one asking, saying these things,
or are you, the one answering?

ALCIBIADES
I.

SOCRATES
Then so far in all the argument, was I the one asking?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And were you the one answering?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So then which of us has spoken what's been said?

ALCIBIADES
Apparently I have, Socrates, from what I admitted.

SOCRATES
And it was said Alcibiades didn't know about justice,
but thought he did,
and was about to go into the assembly
to advise Athenians about what he doesn't know?

ALCIBIADES
It appears that way.

SOCRATES
And yet you're right, my friend,
for mad is the scheme you have in mind to attempt,
to teach what you don't know,
having neglected to learn it.

ALCIBIADES
I think, Socrates, Athenians and the other Greeks
are rarely advised which is more just or more unjust;
for this they believe is obvious;
so passing over that,
they consider which will be advantageous in practice.
For I think the just and advantageous aren't the same,
but many have profited by committing great wrongs,
while others acting justly have gained no advantage.

SOCRATES
But if the just and advantageous happen to be different,
you don't think you know what is advantageous, do you?

ALCIBIADES
Well, what's to prevent it, Socrates?
Unless again you'll ask me from whom I learned it
or how I discovered it myself.

SOCRATES
What a way to do things!
If you say something that is not correct
and it's proven so in a previous argument,
like a worn-out coat you'll no longer wear that proof.
I ask again how you learned to know the advantageous.
But since you no longer like the style of this argument,
farewell to whether or not you know the advantageous,
but tell me whether justice and advantage
are the same or not.
Why don't you demonstrate it, asking me as I did you,
or even explain it by your own argument?

ALCIBIADES
But I don't know if I can explain it to you, Socrates.

SOCRATES
But in the assembly you'll have to persuade each one.
Come on, start by practicing on me and try to prove
how the just sometimes is not advantageous.

ALCIBIADES
You're insolent, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then with this insolence
I intend to persuade you of the opposite
of what you're not willing to persuade me.

ALCIBIADES
Go ahead, for I don't think I'll be harmed by it.

SOCRATES
There you may be prophetic;
but tell me, do you say
some just actions are advantageous, but others aren't?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Are some beautiful actions advantageous, and some not?

ALCIBIADES
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
Can a base action be just?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Then are all just actions beautiful?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And are all beautiful actions good?

ALCIBIADES
I think, Socrates, some beautiful actions are bad.

SOCRATES
And are some base actions good?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then do you mean in such cases as in war
when someone rescuing a friend was injured or died,
but those not rescuing, as they should, stayed healthy?

ALCIBIADES
Definitely.

SOCRATES
Then such a rescue you say is beautiful
in respect to the attempt to save, which is brave,
but bad in respect to the deaths and wounds?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But isn't the bravery one thing, and the death another?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then it isn't in respect to the same thing
that rescuing the friends is beautiful and bad?

ALCIBIADES
Apparently not.

SOCRATES
Now you said that courage is beautiful.
At what price would you choose to lose it?

ALCIBIADES
I would not even choose life as a coward.

SOCRATES
Then to you is cowardice the worst evil, as bad as death?

ALCIBIADES
I say so.

SOCRATES
Then are death and cowardice opposite to life and courage?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Do you believe the latter are best and the former worst?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then do you say rescuing friends in war is beautiful,
in respect to doing good by the courage?

ALCIBIADES
I do.

SOCRATES
But bad in respect to doing evil by the death?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
So is what does good beautiful,
and is what does bad base?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then to say rescuing friends in war is beautiful but bad
is to say nothing other than it is good but bad.

ALCIBIADES
That seems true, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then the beautiful in its beauty is never bad,
and the base in its baseness is never good.

ALCIBIADES
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Now try this on for size.
Does not whoever acts beautifully also do well?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And are not those doing well happy?

ALCIBIADES
Of course.

SOCRATES
Then are they happy because of the good
which comes from acting beautifully and doing well?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then it seems the beautiful and the good are the same.

ALCIBIADES
It does.

SOCRATES
Then are the good things advantageous or not?

ALCIBIADES
Advantageous.

SOCRATES
And do you remember what we agreed about the just?

ALCIBIADES
I think those acting justly must be acting beautifully.

SOCRATES
And since beautiful actions lead to good things,
and good things are advantageous,
then just actions, Alcibiades, are also advantageous.

ALCIBIADES
It's likely.

SOCRATES
So if anyone stands up to advise the Athenians,
thinking he knows the just and the unjust,
and says that the just is sometimes bad,
would you do anything other than laugh at him,
since you say yourself just actions are advantageous?

ALCIBIADES
By the gods, Socrates,
I don't even know what I'm saying,
and it's really a strange feeling;
for at one time during your questioning
I answer one thing,
and at another time something else.

SOCRATES
And my friend, are you unaware what this feeling is?

ALCIBIADES
I am.

SOCRATES
So do you think if someone asked you
whether you have two eyes or three,
two hands or four, or any other such thing,
at one time would you answer one thing,
and at another time something else, or always the same?

ALCIBIADES
I'm already doubting myself, but I think the same.

SOCRATES
Then is it because you know? Is this the reason?

ALCIBIADES
I think so.

SOCRATES
Then what you answer with unwilling contradictions
must clearly be because you don't know about them.

ALCIBIADES
It's likely.

SOCRATES
And aren't you saying you're confused in your answers
about the just and beautiful and good and advantageous?
Then isn't it clear you're confused about these,
because you don't know about them?

ALCIBIADES
To me it is.

SOCRATES
So is it also true when someone doesn't know something,
that the soul must be confused about that?

ALCIBIADES
Of course. Why not?

SOCRATES
Well, then do you know how to go up into heaven?

ALCIBIADES
By God, not I.

SOCRATES
And does your opinion about this change?

ALCIBIADES
Not at all.

SOCRATES
And do you know the reason, or shall I state it?

ALCIBIADES
State it.

SOCRATES
Because, my friend, you don't think you know it
when you don't know it.

ALCIBIADES
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
If you're aware you don't know something,
then your ignorance of that matter doesn't bother you.
For example, in regard to preparing a sauce,
aren't you aware that you don't know how?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So do you think for yourself how you should prepare it,
or do you turn it over to someone who knows?

ALCIBIADES
I do the latter.

SOCRATES
And if you were sailing on a ship, would you think
whether you should hold the tiller inward or outward,
and in your ignorance become confused,
or turning it over to the pilot would you keep quiet?

ALCIBIADES
I'd let him handle it.

SOCRATES
Then you aren't confused about what you don't know,
as long as you're aware that you don't know.

ALCIBIADES
Not likely.

SOCRATES
Then are you aware that
mistakes in practice occur because of this ignorance,
thinking one knows when one doesn't know?

ALCIBIADES
Again, what do you mean?

SOCRATES
Is the time when we attempt to act,
when we think we know what we're doing?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And when people don't think they know,
do they give it over to others?

ALCIBIADES
Why not?

SOCRATES
So are they the ignorant ones who are unerring in life
because they turn these things over to others?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
So who are the ones making mistakes?
For surely they're not the ones who know?

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Since it's neither the ones who know
nor the ones who are aware they don't know,
are the others left the ones who don't know
but think they do know?

ALCIBIADES
None, but these.

SOCRATES
Then is this ignorance a cause of evils
and the shameful kind of stupidity?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And when it's about the greatest things,
then is it most harmful and shameful?

ALCIBIADES
By far.

SOCRATES
So can you mention anything greater than the just
and the beautiful and the good and the advantageous?

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
And is it about these that you say you're confused?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But if you are confused,
then isn't it clear from the previous argument that
not only are you ignorant of the greatest things,
but also while not knowing them you think you do?

ALCIBIADES
Could be.

SOCRATES
How terrible, Alcibiades,
the misfortune you're suffering!
For you're living with the worst stupidity,
as your own argument has accused you;
and so you dart into politics before being educated.
And you're not the only one to have suffered this,
but many managing affairs of state here have also,
except a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

ALCIBIADES
Yes, Pericles has associated with many who are wise,
and even now at his age he still consults with Damon.

SOCRATES
So then have you ever known of a knowledgeable person
who could not share his knowledge with others?
Like the one who taught you writing was knowledgeable;
didn't he share this knowledge with you and others?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And you too could teach this knowledge to others?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
For a good proof of knowing whatever one knows is this,
when one can also point out another who knows.
So whom has Pericles taught? his sons?

ALCIBIADES
But what if they are practically idiots, Socrates?

SOCRATES
Then what about Cleinias, your brother?

ALCIBIADES
Why would you say Cleinias? He's crazy!

SOCRATES
What about his allowing you to be in your predicament?

ALCIBIADES
I think I'm to blame for not paying attention.

SOCRATES
But has Pericles made anyone wiser, as Zeno has done
with several who paid him and become wise and eminent?

ALCIBIADES
I can't think of any.

SOCRATES
So about yourself, Alcibiades, which will it be?
To stay as you are, or taking care to do something?

ALCIBIADES
Let's advise together, Socrates.
Yet I'm thinking while you're talking and concede.
For it seems to me those managing the state's affairs
are uneducated, except for a few.

SOCRATES
So what of it?

ALCIBIADES
If they were better educated,
one attempting to compete with them
would have to learn and practice like an athlete;
but since they've gone into politics as amateurs,
why practice and take the trouble of learning?
For I know that with my natural ability
I'll quite completely surpass them.

SOCRATES
Oh my good friend, what a statement!
How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages!

ALCIBIADES
Why?

SOCRATES
At your expecting to compete against the people here.
But if you're to make a name for yourself in the world,
you must look to the kings of Sparta and Persia
who are sure to be your rivals in ambition.
For if you're to be a great general,
you must not only be more able than your own soldiers,
but you must compete with your opposing generals,
that is, if you really intend to act well
and become a great leader of the state.

ALCIBIADES
I do intend to.

SOCRATES
Although your advantages of birth, wealth, and influence
may seem great here in Athens, compared to these kings
I'd venture to say that the Queen of Persia would laugh
if she heard such an inconspicuous person is her rival.
For these kings have great wealth and absolute influence
over their people from their royal birth,
their words becoming law immediately,
and every advantage their subjects can give them.
Do you know what education a Persian prince receives?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
When he reaches fourteen years of age,
he is taken over by four royal tutors
who have been selected as the most mature Persians,
the wisest, most just, most prudent, and most brave.
The first teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster,
which is serving the gods and how a king should act;
the most just how to speak truth through all his life;
the most prudent how not to be ruled by any pleasure,
so he may be used to being free and truly a king,
who first masters himself and is not a slave of desire;
and the most brave trains him to be fearless and secure
so he understands that to be afraid is to be enslaved.
But the tutor Pericles appointed for you, Alcibiades,
was so old he was the most useless one in the household.
If this Persian Queen should hear about your ambition,
she could only conclude that either you are mad,
or you're relying on wisdom and taking care;
for these are the only things of value among Greeks.
But isn't it disgraceful that even our enemy's wife
should know better than ourselves what we need?
Therefore, my blessed friend, be convinced by me
and the inscription at Delphi, "Know yourself,"
since we must make great efforts to become wise
if we are to be successful.

ALCIBIADES
So then what should I do, Socrates?

SOCRATES
Let's counsel together how we should become better;
for I too need to be educated, but differ in one way.

ALCIBIADES
In what?

SOCRATES
My trustee is better and wiser
than Pericles, who is yours.

ALCIBIADES
Who is he?

SOCRATES
God, who until today wouldn't let me converse with you;
and trusting in this I say that your distinction
will be through no one else but me.

ALCIBIADES
You're kidding, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Maybe; yet I'm right in saying we two must take care.

ALCIBIADES
That I should, you're not lying.

SOCRATES
Nor in that I should.

ALCIBIADES
So what then should we do?

SOCRATES
There must be no falling off nor weakening, my friend.

ALCIBIADES
That would be embarrassing, Socrates.

SOCRATES
It would; but it must be considered together.
Now we really do want to be the best we can, don't we?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Best at what?

ALCIBIADES
Best at ruling over people and their affairs.

SOCRATES
What kind of affairs?

ALCIBIADES
I mean the ones able to rule in the state
when they are meeting together and using each other.

SOCRATES
So what then is this art?

ALCIBIADES
Good counsel, I call it, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Good counsel for what?

ALCIBIADES
In the better managing and maintaining of the state.

SOCRATES
Then what would be present or absent to attain this?
For example, if you asked me, "What is present or absent
to better manage or maintain a body?"
I would say that health is present and disease absent.
Don't you think so too?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
So what is present when a state is best managed?

ALCIBIADES
It seems to me, Socrates, when there is friendship,
and hating and rebelling are absent.

SOCRATES
Wonderful, Alcibiades! Now tell me what is friendship,
and how can it be brought about?

ALCIBIADES
It's hard to say.

SOCRATES
When the citizens act justly in the state
doesn't friendship arise among them?
ALCIBIADES
I think it does, Socrates.

SOCRATES
So we are back again to justice; but what is justice?

ALCIBIADES
But this is the matter which has me confused.

SOCRATES
But you should be confident,
for if you had realized your problem at age fifty,
it would be hard for you to take care of yourself;
but now you're at the age when you should realize this.

ALCIBIADES
Then what should I do
now that I've realized it, Socrates?

SOCRATES
Answer the questions, Alcibiades, and if you do,
God willing, if we can trust in my prophecy,
you and I both shall become better.

ALCIBIADES
Then I will answer.

SOCRATES
Come then, what is "taking care of yourself"---
often we may not know we aren't taking care of ourselves,
while thinking we are---so when does a person do it?
Is it when one is taking care of one's things,
at that time is one also taking care of oneself?

ALCIBIADES
It seems so to me at least.

SOCRATES
But what? Is someone taking care of one's feet
when one is taking care of what belongs to the feet?

ALCIBIADES
I don't understand.

SOCRATES
As examples, don't rings belong to the hand,
sandals to the feet, and clothes to the body?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
So when we're taking care of our sandals,
are we taking care of our feet?

ALCIBIADES
I don't quite understand, Socrates.

SOCRATES
So what art makes sandals better?

ALCIBIADES
Shoemaking.

SOCRATES
So do we take care of our feet by shoemaking?
Or by that art by which we make feet better?

ALCIBIADES
By that art.

SOCRATES
Aren't feet improved in the same way
as the rest of the body?

ALCIBIADES
I think so.

SOCRATES
Isn't it by gymnastics?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So by gymnastics we take care of our feet, hands and body,
and by shoemaking, ring-engraving and weaving
we take care of what belongs to our feet, hands and body.

ALCIBIADES
Quite right.

SOCRATES
Then by one art we take care of each thing itself,
but by another of what belongs to the thing itself.

ALCIBIADES
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Then when you take care of what belongs to yourself,
you're not taking care of yourself.

ALCIBIADES
Not at all.

SOCRATES
Then what art can we use for taking care of ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
I can't say.

SOCRATES
But do we at least know it's not the one
by which we would make any of our belongings better,
but the one by which we would make ourselves better?

ALCIBIADES
That's true.

SOCRATES
Could we ever know what art
makes sandals and rings better,
if we don't know sandals and rings themselves?

ALCIBIADES
Impossible.

SOCRATES
Then would we ever know what art makes ourselves better
being ignorant of what we are ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
Impossible.

SOCRATES
Then does it really happen to be easy to know oneself,
and was it some careless person who inscribed the words
"Know yourself" on the temple at Delphi;
or is it something hard and not for everyone?

ALCIBIADES
It seems to me to be for everyone, but also quite hard.

SOCRATES
But whether it's easy or not,
nonetheless the fact remains, by knowing this,
we would know how to take care of ourselves,
but being ignorant of it, we never would.

ALCIBIADES
That is so.

SOCRATES
But come now, in what way is a self itself discovered?
For thus we may soon discover whatever we are ourselves.

ALCIBIADES
Correct.

SOCRATES
So it holds toward God.
With whom are you conversing now? Isn't it me?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then I also with you?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then is Socrates the one talking?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And Alcibiades the one listening?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And does Socrates use speech in talking?

ALCIBIADES
Of course.

SOCRATES
The one using and what is used, aren't they different?

ALCIBIADES
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
For example, a leather-cutter cuts with a knife.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then is the one cutting and using it one thing,
and what is used in cutting another?

ALCIBIADES
Of course.

SOCRATES
So then also what the harpist plays
and the harpist himself would be different?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Now this is just what I was asking,
if the one using and what is being used are different.

ALCIBIADES
They are.

SOCRATES
So what do we say of the leather-cutter?
Does he cut with tools alone or also with his hands?

ALCIBIADES
He uses his hands.

SOCRATES
Is the leather-cutter also using his eyes?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And we agree the using and what is used are different?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then are a leather-cutter and harpist different
from their hands and eyes with which they work?

ALCIBIADES
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Then also is a person using the whole body?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Since the one using and what is being used are different,
then is a person different from one's own body?

ALCIBIADES
It's likely.

SOCRATES
So whatever is a person?

ALCIBIADES
I can't say.

SOCRATES
But you can say that he's the one using the body.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
So what else uses it other than a soul?

ALCIBIADES
Nothing else.

SOCRATES
And is it ruling?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Now I don't think anyone would disagree
that a person is one of three things---
soul or body or both together as one whole.

ALCIBIADES
What then?
SOCRATES
Did we not agree this ruler of the body is the person?

ALCIBIADES
We did.

SOCRATES
So then does a body rule itself?

ALCIBIADES
Not at all.

SOCRATES
For we said it is ruled.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then this could not be the self we are seeking.

ALCIBIADES
It's not likely.

SOCRATES
Then do both together rule the body,
and is this a person?

ALCIBIADES
Perhaps it is.

SOCRATES
That's not likely;
for they're not ruling together when
one or the other has no part in both together ruling.
If the body is merely a tool of the soul,
it's inconceivable that the two together can be ruling.
We shouldn't consider that part that is a tool
as being the real self of a person, should we?

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Then what's left is that
the person is nothing else than soul.

ALCIBIADES
Precisely.

SOCRATES
So do you require clearer proof the soul is the person?

ALCIBIADES
By God, it seems to me it's sufficiently clear.

SOCRATES
If not exactly at least it's tolerably satisfactory;
for we shall know exactly
when we've discovered what now we passed over,
because it involves much consideration.

ALCIBIADES
What is that?

SOCRATES
It was just said that
first this self itself must be considered;
but now instead of the self itself
we've been considering what each person is.
And perhaps it will be satisfying,
for we couldn't say anything
is more lord over ourselves than the soul.

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Then is it fitting to say you and I are using arguments
to converse with each other by the soul to the soul?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then this was what we also said a little while ago,
that Socrates is conversing
with Alcibiades using argument,
not to your face, but arguing to you, the soul.

ALCIBIADES
It seems so to me.

SOCRATES
Then to know oneself is to gain knowledge of the soul.

ALCIBIADES
It's likely.

SOCRATES
But whoever knows what belongs to the body,
has known one's things but not oneself.

ALCIBIADES
That is so.

SOCRATES
Then no physician knows himself,
because he is a physician,
nor an athletic trainer, because he's a trainer.

ALCIBIADES
It's not likely.

SOCRATES
Then farmers and workers are far from knowing themselves,
for they know even more remote things,
knowing the things which serve the body.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Then if it's sensible to know oneself,
none of these are sensible in respect to the art.

ALCIBIADES
None, it seems to me.

SOCRATES
Then again whoever serves a body,
serves one's own things but does not serve oneself?

ALCIBIADES
Could be.

SOCRATES
And furthermore whoever serves money,
serves neither oneself nor one's own things,
but what is even more remote from one's things?

ALCIBIADES
It seems so to me.

SOCRATES
Then the money-maker does not even do his own business.

ALCIBIADES
Correct.

SOCRATES
Then if someone has been a lover of Alcibiades' body,
that one is not in love with Alcibiades,
but with something belonging to Alcibiades.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But your lover loves the soul?

ALCIBIADES
It appears necessary from the argument.

SOCRATES
So whoever loves your body,
when its bloom ceases, departs;
but whoever loves your soul does not go away,
as long as it is getting better.

ALCIBIADES
It's likely.

SOCRATES
And I'm not going away when the body's bloom is ceasing,
but am remaining, while the others have departed.

ALCIBIADES
You're doing well, Socrates; and you shouldn't go away.

SOCRATES
Then be eager to be most beautiful.

ALCIBIADES
But I shall be eager.

SOCRATES
Now if you aren't corrupted by the Athenian democracy,
I'll never forsake you.
For I'm especially afraid you might be corrupted
by becoming a lover of popularity; so be careful.

ALCIBIADES
How?

SOCRATES
Exercise first, blessed one,
and learn what you need to know
in order to enter the business of the state,
so you may have a remedy and not suffer anything bad.

ALCIBIADES
It seems to me you're right, Socrates,
but try to explain how we may take care of ourselves.

SOCRATES
Thus so much has been accomplished by us in advance;
for what we are, is pretty much agreed upon;
we were afraid tripping on this we might not notice
we're taking care of something other than ourselves.

ALCIBIADES
That's right.

SOCRATES
Next we must take care of the soul and look into this.

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
And give over to others
the taking care of bodies and money.

ALCIBIADES
What then?

SOCRATES
So in what way could we know this most distinctly?
Since knowing this, as likely, we'll also know ourselves.
Then speaking well before God are we not comprehending
what we just now remembered of the Delphic inscription?

ALCIBIADES
What are you getting at, Socrates?

SOCRATES
I'll tell you what I suspect this inscription advises us.
For chances are there aren't many models of this,
but only in respect to sight.

ALCIBIADES
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
You consider it also.
If to our eye as to a person,
it advised us, "See yourself,"
how should we take up what it recommends?
Then wouldn't it looking into this,
into which the eye is looking, intend to see itself?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
What can we think of, looking into which
we may see at the same time that and ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly, Socrates, into mirrors and such things.

SOCRATES
That's correct.
Then in the eye by which we see
is there also such a thing?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So have you observed that
the face of the one looking into the opposite eye
appears in that eye as in a mirror, in its pupil,
which reflects an image of the one looking?

ALCIBIADES
That's true.

SOCRATES
Then an eye seeing an eye,
and looking into this best part by which it sees,
thus may see itself.

ALCIBIADES
It appears so.

SOCRATES
But if it should look into any other part of the person
or at anything else except into what is like itself,
it will not see itself.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Then if an eye intends to see itself,
it must look into an eye by itself,
and into that region of the eye
in which its goodness is innate; and is this sight?

ALCIBIADES
That is so.

SOCRATES
Then, Alcibiades, if the soul intends to know herself,
must she look into soul by herself
and especially into this region of her
where the goodness of the soul is innate, into wisdom,
and into anything else which happens to be like this?

ALCIBIADES
It seems so to me, Socrates.

SOCRATES
So is there anything of the soul more divine than this,
which is concerned with knowing and thinking?

ALCIBIADES
There isn't.

SOCRATES
Then this part of her is like the divine,
and one looking into this also comes to know the divine,
and thus would especially know oneself.

ALCIBIADES
Apparently.

SOCRATES
And do we agree that to know oneself is to be sensible?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
So then not knowing ourselves nor being sensible
are we able to know our own belongings bad and good?

ALCIBIADES
How could that be, Socrates?

SOCRATES
For perhaps it appears to you impossible
that not knowing Alcibiades it's possible to know
that Alcibiades' belongings are Alcibiades'.

ALCIBIADES
It's impossible, by God.

SOCRATES
Nor even that our belongings are ours,
if we don't know ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
How could we?

SOCRATES
And then if not our belongings,
not the business of our belongings either?

ALCIBIADES
Apparently not.

SOCRATES
And whoever is ignorant of one's own belongings,
would also probably be ignorant of others',
and if of others' belongings, then of others' business.

ALCIBIADES
What then?

SOCRATES
Then one will also be ignorant of the state's business.

ALCIBIADES
Necessarily.

SOCRATES
Then such a person could never be a statesman.

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
Nor an economist either.

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Nor will they know what they're doing.

ALCIBIADES
They won't.

SOCRATES
And won't the ones not knowing make mistakes?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Making mistakes will they do badly
both in private and in public?

ALCIBIADES
Of course.

SOCRATES
And doing badly will they not be wretched?

ALCIBIADES
Very.

SOCRATES
And what of those for whom they are doing so?

ALCIBIADES
They'll be wretched too.

SOCRATES
So if one is not sensible and good, one can't be happy.

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Then the bad people are wretched.

ALCIBIADES
Very.

SOCRATES
Then it's not the one who has become wealthy
who is delivered from being most wretched,
but the one who has become sensible.

ALCIBIADES
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Then it's not walls nor warships nor arms states need,
Alcibiades, if they intend to be happy,
nor numbers nor size without goodness.

ALCIBIADES

That's right.

SOCRATES
If you intend to manage the state's business well,
then you must impart goodness to the citizens.

ALCIBIADES
Of course.

SOCRATES
But could anyone impart something one doesn't have?

ALCIBIADES
How could one?

SOCRATES
Then first you must gain goodness for yourself,
and for anyone else who intends to rule
and take care of oneself and one's belongings
not in private only but also in the state.

ALCIBIADES
That's true.

SOCRATES
So it's not power nor rule you must provide for yourself
in order to do what you want for yourself and the state,
but justice and prudence.

ALCIBIADES
Apparently.

SOCRATES
For acting justly and sensibly you and the state
will be acting in a way friendly to God.

ALCIBIADES
Naturally.

SOCRATES
And as we said in the previous argument,
you will act looking into the divine and bright.

ALCIBIADES
It would appear so.

SOCRATES
And looking at this you will regard and know
both yourselves and your own good.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then will you be acting correctly and well?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
If you act thus, I'm willing to pledge you'll be happy.

ALCIBIADES
And I can rely on that.

SOCRATES
But if you act unjustly, looking at the godless and dark,
then you'll likely do similar acts, ignoring yourselves.

ALCIBIADES
It's likely.

SOCRATES
For if someone has the power to do what one wants,
but doesn't have intelligence,
what's likely to result personally and also for a state?
For example, if one happens to be sick
and has the power to run wherever one wants,
without any medical intelligence,
but dictating so that no one would chastise them,
what would be the result?
Wouldn't the body's health likely be ruined?

ALCIBIADES
That's true.

SOCRATES
And what about on a ship, if one had the same power,
deprived of the intelligence and goodness of navigation,
do you see what would happen to them?

ALCIBIADES
I do; they'd all perish.

SOCRATES
Then in the same way in a state
among all rulers and authorities lacking in goodness,
does acting badly follow?

ALCIBIADES
Necessarily.

SOCRATES
Then it's not useful to be provided with dictatorship,
Alcibiades, neither for oneself nor for the state,
if one intends to be happy; but goodness is useful.

ALCIBIADES
That's true.

SOCRATES
And until you have goodness, it's better to be ruled
by a better than for a man as well as a child to rule.

ALCIBIADES
Apparently.

SOCRATES
Then it's better for a bad person to serve.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then the bad are enslaved by their vices,
and the good become free,
because they govern themselves.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Which do you prefer, Alcibiades, freedom or slavery?

ALCIBIADES
Freedom.

SOCRATES
And now do you perceive where you are?
Are you on the side of the free or not?

ALCIBIADES
I think I see only too clearly.

SOCRATES
So do you know how you might escape
this condition you are now in?

ALCIBIADES
I do.

SOCRATES
How?

ALCIBIADES
If it be your wish, Socrates.

SOCRATES
You're not speaking correctly, Alcibiades.

ALCIBIADES
But what should I say?

SOCRATES
If it be God's will.

After a long pause, Alcibiades gets up to go.

SOCRATES
Where are you going, Alcibiades?

ALCIBIADES
To offer prayers to God.

SOCRATES
You look so glum; is it because
the gods answer some prayers and not others,
and often the result is not as we wish it would be?

ALCIBIADES
I'm afraid so.

SOCRATES
I should advise you to be very careful,
for do you know what happens to most people?

ALCIBIADES
What?

SOCRATES
When they pray they think they ask for good things,
but in their ignorance they are actually requesting
what is not really good for them, but bad.
So if the results are bad, isn't this madness?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Wouldn't you call this madness the opposite of wisdom?

ALCIBIADES
I would.

SOCRATES
Then if we're not wise, our prayers may be madness,
since without knowing it we ask for evil.

ALCIBIADES
But what's to be done?

SOCRATES
Didn't we agree before that
each person is wise in what one knows---
a shoemaker for working on sandals,
a pilot for navigating at sea,
and an architect for planning a house?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But in the state, does each artisan necessarily know
how and when and where each is to have its place?
Don't they tend to place their own above the others?

ALCIBIADES
Surely they do.

SOCRATES
Then each of them is not really wise
as to what is truly best for the whole,
meaning the best time, place, and use of each art.

ALCIBIADES
I agree.

SOCRATES
Thus what we really need
if our prayers are to be truly good
is this knowledge of what is best for everyone,
or for the good of the whole state.

ALCIBIADES
That's true.

SOCRATES
Then we should listen to the poet who said, "King Zeus,
give unto us what is good, whether we pray or not;
but what is grievous, even if we pray for it, avert it."
Thus we can prevent our prayers from becoming curses
because of our ignorance of what is good.

ALCIBIADES
How so?

SOCRATES
Well, when we humans pray to the gods,
who do you think knows the absolute good better,
us or them?

ALCIBIADES
The gods, certainly.

SOCRATES
Then shouldn't we pray only for the best,
this absolute good,
and since they understand it better than we do,
shouldn't we ask the gods to bless us
according to their wisdom
rather than demanding they fill our human requests
according to our ignorance,
which we agreed was madness, didn't we?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, but now I feel very confused again.

SOCRATES
Homer tells how Athena
removed the mist from Diomede's eyes,
"That he might well discern both god and man,"
and perhaps the god will clear away this mist
that surrounds your soul, so you can discern the good.

ALCIBIADES
I would be most grateful to the god if he would.

-end-

copyright 1996, 2008 by Sanderson Beck

SOCRATES: A Series of Philosophical Plays is now published as a book. For ordering information, please click here.

SOCRATES
"Know Yourself"
The Sophists
Prudence and Courage
The Lover
The Banquet
Inspiration
Rhetoric
Justice
The Good
The Trial
Prison and Death

Introduction to Socrates and Plato
ALCIBIADES by Plato
APOLOGIA SOKRATOUS (DEFENSE OF SOCRATES) by Plato
CRITO by Plato
PHAEDO by Plato

The Socratic Problem
Life of Socrates
Attitudes of Socrates
How Socrates Taught
What Socrates Taught
Did Socrates Practice It?
Influence of Socrates

BECK index